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Doing Business and U. S. Commercial
Treaties: The Case with the Member
States of the EEC
loseph I. Norton
A T THE PRESENT TIME, the United States has treaties of the
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation type with all six of the
Member States of the European Economic Community.' In addition,
there are in existence F.C.N. treaties with two of the three ac-
ceding members to the Europe-
an Community,2 and a commer-
THE AUTHOR: JOsEPH J. NORTON cial treaty of limited scope has
(LL.B., University of Edinburgh; LL.M., been in effect with the United
University of Texas; LL.M., University Kingdom since 1815.
of Michigan; S.J.D. Candidate, Univer-
sity of Michigan) is a member of the The objective of this study
Texas bar and associated with a Dallas will be to examine the func-
law firm. He is also a Lecturer in Law
at Southern Methodist University. tional and legal status of these
F.C.N. type treaties with the
members of the European Eco-
nomic Community. Accordingly, the discussion will first center on
1 See: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Italy, Feb. 2, 1948,
T.I.A.S. No. 1965, 79 U.N.T.S. 171 (effective July 26, 1949), [hereinafter cited as Ital-
ian Treaty]. Supplemental Agreement, Sept. 26, 1951, 12 U.S.T. 131, T.I.A.S. No.
4685, 404 U.N.T.S. 326 (effective March 2, 1961).
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Oct. 29, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593, 273 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective July
14, 1956) [hereinafter cited as 1954 German Treaty).
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Netherlands, March 27,
1956, 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942, 285 U.N.T.S. 231 (effective Dec. 5, 1957)
[hereinaftee cited as Dutch Treaty).
Convention of Establishment with France, Nov. 25, 1959, 11 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S.
No. 4625, 401 U.N.T.S 74 (effective Dec. 21, 1960) [hereinafter cited as French Trea-
ty].
Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation with Luxembourg, Feb. 23,
1962, 14 U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306, 474 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective March 28, 1963)
[hereinafter cited as Luxembourg Treaty].
Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation with Belgium, Feb. 21, 1961,
14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432, 480 U.N.T.S. 149 (effective Oct. 3, 1963) therein-
aftef cited as Belgium Treaty].
2 See: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Ireland, Jan. 21, 1950,
1 U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155, 206 U.N.T.S. 269 (effective Sept. 14, 1950) (herein-
after cited as Irish Treaty].
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Denmark, Oct. 1, 1951, 12
U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797, 421 U.N.T.S. 105 (effective July 30, 1961) [herein-
after cited as Danish Treaty].
F.C.N. TREATIES AND COMMON MARKET
the historical use of bilateral commercial treaties in American eco-
nomic and foreign policy. Further analysis will consider the post-
war significance of these treaties with the nations of Western Europe,
and the effect the creation of the European Economic Community
has and will have on the status of these F.C.N. treaties. The study
will conclude with a discussion of the alternatives for a rational ap-
proach to the various problems raised by the EEC law and practice.
I. HISTORICAL SETTING
The importance of commercial treaties to the United States first
arose in 1776 at the Continental Congress, where a committee was
appointed by the delegates to draft outlines to be used in the nego-
tiation of commercial treaties.4 Geared to the specific goals of Amer-
ican foreign policy, the express objectives of the committee included
not only the encouragement of trade relations and the protection
of American interests abroad," but also "political and economic sup-
port for independence."6  The coupling of political and economic
goals, evidenced in the treaties negotiated in the pre-Constitutional
period, can also be seen in the early nineteenth century port-opening
activities of the American clipper ship and as a basic premise of the
Monroe Doctrine. Thus from the very beginnings of American
practice, the bilateral commercial treaty must be viewed as a viable
3 Convention to Regulate Commerce with the United Kingdom, signed July 3, 1815,
8 Star. 228; T.S. 110, I Malloy 624 (effective July 3, 1815) [hereinafter cited as British
Treaty).
4 As noted by G. Schwarzenberger, The Principles and Standards of International
Economic Law, 117 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 19 (1966) : The origins of the usage of commercial
treaties "goes back to the very dawn of international law." For further consideration
of the origins of the commercial treaty see B. Nolde, Droit et technique des Trait~e des
Commerce, 3 R.C.A.D.I. 291 (1924). With regard to the question of commercial
treaties raised at the Continental Congress of 1776, a committee composed of such men
as Benjamin Franklin and John Adams was appointed to draft an outline to be fol-
lowed in the future negotiation of commercial treaties. See specifically JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, vol. V, 768-78 (Ford et al., ed., 1906).
5 See Treaty of Peace and Commerce with the Netherlands, Oct. 8, 1782, II Malloy
1233 (effective Jan. 22, 1783); and Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Sweden,
April 3, 1783, 11 Malloy 1725 (effective Sept. 25, 1783).
6V. Setser, Treaties to Aid American Business Abroad, 40 FOREIGN COMMERCE
WEEKLY No. 11, 3 (Sept. 11, 1950). An example of this early connection between
the use of commercial treaties in pursuit of American foreign policy aims is clearly
visible in the package arrangement with France in 1778 for the conclusion, on the very
same day in fact, of both the Treaty of Amity and Commerce-and the Treaty of Alli-
ance with France. As commented by J. PRATT, A HISTORY OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY 20 (2nd ed., 1965): "On December 17 (1777), the American commissioners
were informed that France would grant recognition and make a treaty with the United
States, and on February 6, 1778 a treaty of amity and commerce and a treaty of alliance
were signed at Paris, the latter to take effect if Great Britain went to war with France
because of the former."
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and essential vehicle for pursuing the various aims of American
foreign policy.7
From the aspects of facilitating commerce between the signa-
tories and of establishing certain standards for the treatment of
American citizens and merchants, the bilateral commercial treaty is
intended to be a "long-term instrument that embodies basic princi-
ples of law holding good over the long-term."' Historically, how-
ever, these principles of law were not geared to benefit corporations,
even though this type of juristic person was known and existing in
the early days of American diplomatic history. Corporations were
excluded from the protective umbrella of the commercial treaty pri-
marily because such business associations were initially looked upon
as a very suspect creature which should be dealt with in a highly re-
stricted fashion,10 and 'because the corporation during the nineteenth
century simply did not fit into the mobile image of the commercial
treaty in the promotion of trade and the protection of the vehicles
of trade (goods, ships and merchants).
In perspective, the bilateral commercial treaty in early American
practice was a multipurpose instrument designed to foster certain
objectives of American foreign policy, to create a broad basis for
mutual understanding and contact between the signatories, and to
7 H. Walker, Jr., The Post-War Commercial Treaty Program of the United States,
73 POL ScI. Q. 57, 58-9 (1958), where the author states:
Depending on the era in which the treaties were negotiated, they have as well
been responsive to varying special motivations. In pre-Constitutional days,
for example, they betokened and helped secure recognition of American in-
dependence. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the period in which
the American clipper became mistress of the seas, they were employed to open
foreign ports to American shipping. The conclusion of the treaties with
countries of Latin America in this period, through emphasizing the sover-
eignty and rising importance of those countries and their ties with the United
States, served to emphasize the Monroe doctrine; and in the era of intense pow-
er competition for colonies and spheres of influence, they served to support
the open door principle.
8H. Walker, Jr., Convention of Establishment Between the United States and
France, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 393, 395 (1960).
9 See generally H. Walker, Jr., Provisions on Companies in United States Comm er-
cial Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 373 (1956).
10 See E. MASON, THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY x, (1970) : "As a legal
institution, the corporation has its roots in medieval history. It was used by Angevin,
Tudor and Stewart kings in England partly as a means of getting things done, partly
as an extended arm of royal power. Speculation, dishonesty, and financial excesses
caused the South Sea Bubble crash in 1720, and so discredited the corporation as an
institution that for nearly a hundred years thereafter it was virtually outlawed in the
English-speaking world. Grudgingly, its use was resumed in the nineteenth century,
both in Britain and in the nascent United States, though under severe limitations."
For a vivid historical analysis of the early role of the corpor'ation in American society
see Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-568
(1933).
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establish certain standards for the treatment of American citizens
abroad. The commercial treaty was initially both an instrument
of American foreign policy and a long-term international agree-
ment which attempted to explicate various legal standards for the
treatment of American goods, shipping and citizens."
In the years following the United States' involvement in the
first World War, perhaps the most significant development in Amer-
ican commercial treaty practice was the adoption of the principle
of unconditional most favored nation treatment. 2  Prior to the
drafting of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular
Rights with Germany in 1923," a the United States had utilized the
conditional version of the most favored nation clause, while its Eu-
ropean counterparts had taken to the unconditional version. 4 In
the year of the German Accord, Secretary of State Hughes proposed
the inclusion of a most favored nation clause in the negotiation of
new commercial treaties, under the terms of which "the United
States [would) guarantee and expect to be guaranteed unconditional
equality of treatment.""' Considered by Secretary Hughes to be in
the interest of the United States in competing with the trade of other
11 For further consideration of the nature of commercial treaties see R. Wilson,
Commercial Treaties: Their Use in International Law Teaching, in Legal Practice, and
in Legal Research, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS 22 (8th
Summer Institute, Univ. of Michigan, 1955).
12 The unconditional m/f/n clause, as defined in modern U.S. commercial treaties is
that treatment "accorded within the territories of a Party upon terms no less favorable
than the treatment accorded therein, in like situations, to nationals companies, prod-
ucts, vessels or other objects, as the case may be, of any third country [See, e.g., 1954
German Treaty, Article XXV (4) supra note 1]. For a comparative study of the m/f/n
clause see generally, International Law Commission, The Most-Favoured.Nation Clause,
First Report by Mr. Endre Ustof, Special Rapporteur, U.N.G.A. Doc. A/CN.4/213,
at 39 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ustor Report].
13 See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany, Dec.
8, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132, T.S. No. 725, 52 L.N.T.S. 133 (effective Oct. 14, 1925).
14 As commented by C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED
AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES vol. 2, 74-76 (1922): "The attitude of the
United States has been at variance with that of the principal commercial States of Eu-
rope, which changed 'first from the unconditional to the conditional, and then back to
the uniform use of the unconditional' construction.... (T) he practice of making rec-
iprocity treaty requires the conditional construction of the most-favored-nation clause,
and that construction must be expected to occasion, as it has heretofore, frequent con-
troversies...." In effect, befor'e 1923, American commercial practice of granting only
conditional m/f/n treatment meant that conditions would only be extended upon the
reciprocal return of the same compensation or its equivalent [See, e.g., comments by
L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW vol. 1, 773 (5th ed., 1937)). For an example
of a conditional m/f/n clause see Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
with Peru, Sept. 6, 1870, II Malloy 1414, Article III.
15 As quoted in G. HACKWORTH, V DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw at 272
(1943).
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countries in the markets of the world, 16 except in provisions dealing
with consular rights and functions, 17 the use of the unconditional
most favored nation standard has proved to be the backbone of the
United States commercial treaty policy.'"
The same reasons which dictated a change in American policy
with regard to the standard of treatment used in bilateral commer-
cial treaties also called for a substantial alteration of United States
policy with regard to tariffs.' Upon entering office,2 President
16 The reasons for the shift in American Commercial policy were perhaps more var-
ied than Secretary Hughes suggested. See W. KELLY, STUDIES IN UNITED STATES
COMMERCIAL POLICY 3, 44-48 (1963). Kelly has rooted out a series of reasons for this
shift in American commercial policy: first, the use by the United States in the 1890's and
after of the conditional m/f/n standard began to cause visible hostility with certain of
her allies; second, as a result of this hostility, the United States experienced difficulty in
renewing or revising old commercial treaties, and in negotiating new ones on the con-
ditional basis, which in many cases left American exports without the protection of
any treaty standard against discrimination; third, at the turn of the century the United
States found itself more and more an exporter of manufactured goods which were high-
ly competitive with like European goods, and this factor took away one of the char-
acteristics that had shielded previous American exports (during the 19th century these
exports had been mostly primary products) from trade discrimination; and fourth, the
changed international financial position of the United States at the end of World War
I from a debtor to a creditor nation made American exports more in need of a uniform
and unconditional standard of protection.
17 As noted by M. WHITEMAN, 14 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 752-3
(1970), the shift from the conditional to the unconditional m/f/n clause did not occur
with respect to those treaty provisions dealing with consular eights. This is still the
case today. However, in the post World War II U.S. commercial treaties series, the
trend has been to renegotiate the consular provisions in separate non-commercial trea-
ties.
18 Note, however, the increasing emphasis in postwar treaties on the national treat-
ment standard. See infra, at p. 13.
19 As emphasized by Secretary of State Hull, in arguing for acceptance of a new
American trade policy in the 1930's:
(S)hortly after the World War, ignoring the economic transformation that
had taken place, we began to erect barriers to our foreign trade not con-
sistent with our newly achieved creditor position nor our efficiency in pro-
duction. Within the short space of a decade we had raised our tariff rates
on three successive occasions, thereby preparing the destruction of our vast
foreign trade, upon which a large share of our prosperity rested. This infer-
ence, opportunist in spirit, uncoordinated with our other policies, and
contrary to our long-term interests, represented a definite break with the ideal
of economic liberalism which had made possible this great commercial ex-
pansion. . . . Just at the time when the disturbed international relations of
the post-war period called for the broadest possible development of world
trade as a means of minimizing shocks and creating a new international bal-
ance, we adopted an unduly high protectionist policy which played its part in
the subsequent world-wide collapse and contributed in so important a mea-
sure to the breakdown in international commercial and financial relations.
The Foreign Commercial Policy of the United States, [1933-341 U.S. DEPT.
OF STATE COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIES No. 9, at 3-4.
20 Hull's attitude toward a liberal foreign trade policy can be seen in 1 THE MEM-
OIRS OF CORDULL HULL 81 (1948): "The year 1916 is a milestone in my political
thinking... I embraced the philosophy I carried throughout my twelve years as Secre-
[Vol. 5: 4
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Franklin Roosevelt was urged by his Secretary of State Cordell Hull
to press for an end to the previous decade of high "flexible," non-
negotiable tariffs as manifested by the Tariff Acts of 1922 and
1930.21 Roosevelt's insistence that the mutual reduction of trade
barriers was an essential means for bringing America out of tle
Great Depression culminated in the passage of the Trade Agreement
Act of 1934.22 The 1934 Act authorized the President to enter into
trade agreements for a period of three years and to lower tariffs
without specific congressional approval to fifty percent of their 1934
level, although he could not move goods from the dutiable to free
list.28
What is important for present purposes however, is that the
Trade Agreement Act of 1934 which authorized the reciprocal trade
agreement, introduced a new approach for dealing with the facili-
tation of foreign trade.24 Unlike the bilateral commercial treaty
which set forth broad standards of treatment for trading partners,
the reciprocal trade agreement dealt primarily with schedules of tar-
iff reductions on the unconditional most favored nation basis and
binding of rates on special articles.2 5  With the 1934 Act the bilat-
tary of State, into the Trade Agreements, into numerous speeches and statements ad-
dressed to this country and to the world. From then on, to me, unhampered trade
dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition,
with war."
21 Concerning the protectionism of the twenties, F. Taussig has commented: "All
this constitutes what may be called, to repeat, the club policy. We make no offer. We
fix our own duties quite as we please, and quite unalterably. With each successive
tariff act, we shove them higher and higher. We make them applicable to all countries
without mitigation. And then we insist that all countries shall in turn treat us just
as well as they treat any third country. If any one of them grants a favor or reduction
to another, this must automatically inure to us also. If not, the President has the club
in his hands. He may impose heavy additional duties on their products, may even ex-
clude them entirely." 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 397, 398 (1933).
22 An Act to Amend the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (1934).
23 See for a consideration of the constitutionality of the 1934 Act, F. Sayre, The
Constitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act, 39 COL. L. REV. 751 (1939).
24 For analysis of the Act see Hawkins and Norwood, The Legislative Basis of United
States Commercial Policy, in STUDIES IN UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL POLICY 69
(1963), who note at 69: "It thereby gave a new direction to United States commer-
cial policy, which had considered the tariff as virtually 'untouchable' and not subject
to negotiation with foreign countries."
25 On the distinction between the reciprocal trade agreement and the commercial
treaty, R. Wilson has commented: "Both instruments, the commercial treaty and the
trade agreement, look to multilateral trade. The basic difference, of course, aside from
procedure (the trade agreements being executive instruments which ate authorized by
Congress in advance of their making, while each commercial treaty must go to the
Senate for approval after its negotiation), is that the treaties set forth principles and
standards of treatment, whereas the trade agreement, though it may embody some state-
ment of principle (as on state trading and most-favored-nation treatment), chiefly com-
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eral commercial treaty would no longer be the principle instrument
of American commercial policy for the promotion of foreign
trade.20
A final element worthy of note, evident in the postwar commer-
cial treaties, was the specific treaty recognition of the status'of com-
panies. In the Treaty of 1911 with Japan, the description of per-
sons entitled to commercial treaty rights spoke only of - 'citizens,'
'subjects,' 'inhabitants,' or 'nationals.' ",27 As to companies, the 1911
treaty simply permitted access to local courts, while specifying that
this limited treaty recognition did not grant to companies the same
benefits extended to treaty nationals in regard to engaging in busi-
ness activities.2 8 With the negotiation of the 1923 commercial trea-
ty with Germany, this limited recognition of treaty companies was
enlarged to embrace non-profit legal persons, but as in the treaty
with Japan, the benefits extended to companies were restricted to ac-
cess to courts.29 In addition the German treaty contained a more
stringent test for such recognition, requiring a company not only to
be "duly organized under the laws" of one of the Contracting Par-
ties, but also to maintain a "central office" in the state of incorpo-
ration and to pursue no aims within the territory of the host state
which would be contrary to the laws of that state.80 This "host na-
prises schedules of tariff reductions and bindings on specific articles. [Commercial
Treaties: Their Use in International Law Teaching, supra note 11, at 2 3).
26 For a further consideration of the continuing importance of the reciprocal trade
agreement in American commercial policy see S. Metzger, The Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, 57 GEO. L.J. 425 (1963); J. EVANS, THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN
TRADE POLICY (1971); and C. FULDA and W. ScHWARTz, REGULATION OF INTERNA-
NATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT ch. IV (1970).
2 H. Walker, Jr., Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties,
supra note 9, at 375.
2 8 See Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan, Feb. 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 1504,
T.S. 558 (effective April 4, 1911). Article VII of this treatry reads as follows:
"Limited-liability and other companies and associations, commercial, industrial,
and financial, already or hereafter to be organized in accordance with the laws
of either High Contracting Party and domiciled in the territories of such Patty,
are authorized, in the territories of the other, to exercise their rights and ap-
pear in the courts eithef as plaintiffs or defendants, subject to the laws of such
other Party.
The foregoing stipulation has no bearing upon the question whether a
company or association organized in one of the two countries will or will not
be permitted to transact its business or industry on the other, this permission
femaining always subject to the laws and regulations enacted or established
in the respective countries or in any part thereof."
29 For a consideration of the "access to courts" provision in U.S. commercial treaties
see R. Wilson, Access-to-Courts Provisions in U.S. Treaties, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 20
(1953).
30 See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany, Dec. 8,
1923, supra note 13. Article XII of this treaty reads as follows:
[Vol. 5: 4
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tion" approach espoused by the 1923 German treaty set the pattern
for the treatment of companies in the major friendship, commerce
and navigation treaties concluded in the years preceding World War
11.81
II. NEW NEEDS IN U.S. POSTWAR
COMMERCIAL POLICY
While the introduction of the reciprocal trade agreement pro-
gram delimited one of the traditional functions of the bilateral
commercial treaty in American practice, a new function was to de-
velop. As noted by Herman Walker Jr., the factor lending spe-
cial impetus to the postwar Treaty program:
was the need for encouraging and protecting foreign investment,
responsively to the increasing interests of American business abroad
and to the position the United States has now reached as princi-
pal reservoir of investment capital in a world which has become
acutely 'economic-development' conscious. The pre-existing con-
tent of the commercial treaty (now often known as 'FCN treaty')
was therefore overhauled with a view to improving and strengthen-
ing its relevance to investor need ... 32
At the end of the Second World War, in a world largely ren-
dered economically and politically bankrupt, the United States
found itself to be the principal-exporting country in the world and
the leading source of venture capital. To meet this crisis, President
Truman in January of 1949 proposed what has come to be known
as the Point IV Program,88 the major objectives of which were reaf-
"Limited liability and other corporations and associations, whether or not for
pecuniary profit, which have or may hereafter be organized, in accordance with
and under the laws, National, State or Provincial, of either High Contracting
Party and maintains a central office within the territories thereof, shall have
their juridical status recognized by the other High Contracting Party provided
that they pursue no High Contracting Party provided that they pursue no aims
within its territories contrary to its laws. They shall enjoy free access to the
courts of law and equity, on conforming to the laws regulating the matter,
as well as fof the prosecution as for the defense of rights in all degrees of juris-
diction established by law.
The right of such corporations and associations of either High Contract-
ing Party so recognized by the other to establish themselves within its terri-
tories, establish branch offices and fulfill their functions therein shall depend
upon, and be governed solely by, the consent of such Party as expressed by its
National, State, or Provincial Laws."
31 Eleven F.C.N. type treaties were concluded after the 1923 German Treaty until
1938, all of which contained this clause on companies, supra note 29, at 43, note 124.
82 H. Walker, Jr., The Post-War Commercial Treaty Program of the United States,
supra note 7, at 59.
83 See "Point 4" Program for World Economic Progress Through Cooperative Tech-
nical Assistance (remarks of Secretary of State Acheson), 20 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE
BULL. 155 (1949).
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firmation of support for the United Nations, continuance of Amer-
ica's postwar programs for world recovery and the strengthening of
the free nations of the world from the dangers of external aggression.
A further expression of intent embodied in the Truman program,
most germain to our present study, reads as follows:
[W]e must embark on a bold new program for making the bene-
fits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for
the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.... Our aim
should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own
efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for
housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens....
With the cooperation of business, private capital, agriculture, and
labor in this country, this program can greatly increase the indus-
trial activity in other nations and can raise substantially their stan-
dards of living.3 4
Beneath the rhetoric, the core of the fourth point was to increase
the flow of American private investment capital abroad, which in
turn would "benefit both the peoples of the underdeveloped areas
and the rest of the world, including ourselves (U.S.), as well. ' 85
One of the mediums to be utilized in fostering American pri-
vate investment abroad was the bilateral commercial treaty. Ac-
cordingly, with the end of World War II, the United States em-
barked upon the negotiation of a new series of commercial treaties.
As elaborated by the United States Department of State, the treaty
program, was to emphasize expanding and, improving provisions
dealing with the rights of American citizens and their enterprises
abroad. "The principle objective has been to develop, to the extent
that this can be done by treaty, an environment . . . conducive to
the flow of American private capital . . ." (emphasis added).36
The need for creating a favorable environment for the flow of
American investment capital, is better understood when considered
in the context of the economic and political situation existing in
Western Europe at the conclusion of the hostilities: "Great Britain
was exhausted and impoverished; Germany did not exist; France
was barely alive; defeated Italy did not count; and the smaller coun-
tries were not important."'' For the Americans, in the mid and late
forties, the balance of power in Europe was most frightening: on
84The President's "Point 4" Program, 20 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 156 (1949).
85 lnvestment of American Private Capital Abroad, (Statement by Under Secretary
of State Webb), 21 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 305, 306 (1949).
3 6 COMMERCIAL TREATY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES 4-5, (U.S. Dept. of State
Pub. No. 6565, 1958).
87 J. JONES, THE FIFTEEN WEEKS 41 (1955).
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the one side was the battered array of Allied and Axis countries,
and on the other was a worn, yet expanding Soviet Union. Thus
the political imperative that formed the basis for American foreign
policy evolved as a firm pledge to assist in the development of a
politically and economically rejuvenated Western Europe. 8
Through United Nations Relief and Administration financing 9
individual credits to various European nations,40  and especially
through the Marshall Plan,41 the United States gave the initial push
for European economic recovery. Moreover, the United States at-
tempted to protect this postwar economic development through the
military shield provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
8 As quoted by H. PRICE, THE MARSHALL PLAN AND ITS MEANING (1955), George
Kennan, head of the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Staff reflected American
foreign policy when he stated: "The Planning Staff recognizes that the communists are
exploiting the European crisis and that further communist successes would create serious
danger to American security. It considers, however, that American effort in aid of Eu-
rope should be directed not to the combating of communism as such but to the restoe'a-
tion of the economic health and vigor of European Society." Id., at 22.
39 See Joint Resolution to Enable the United States to Participate in the Work of the
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Organization ch. 135, 58 Star. 122 (1944),
for a general treatment of UNRRA, see G. WOODBRIDGE, UNRRA 3 vol. (1950).
S40Joint Resolution Providing for Relief Assistance to the People of Countries De-
vastated by War, ch. 90, 61 Stat. 125 (1947). This act was designed primarliy for the
relief of Austria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Trieste and China.
41 Convinced that the Soviet Union was anticipating a total collapse of Western Eu-
rope, Secretary of State George Marshall unveiled his grand plan for recovery of Europe,
based on American aid and active European participation at Harvard University in June
of 1947. In part, the Marshall Plan reads as follows: "It is already evident that, be-
fore the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate
the-situation and help start the European World on its way to recovery, there must be
some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation
and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to what-
ever action might be taken by this Government .... This is the business of the Europe-
ans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should
consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of
such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a
joint one, agreed to by a number, of not all, European nations. 93 CONG. REC. A3248
(Extension of remarks by Cong. Jurman, quoting General Marshall). On July 16,
1947, sixteen nations, without the presence of Russia and the Eastern European coun-
tries, formed the Committee of European Economic Cooperation which had as its pur-
pose the drafting of a four year recovery program. See Committee of European
Economic Co-operation, July-Sept. 1947, GENERAL REPORT vol. I (1947). For a sum-
mary of this report see 17 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE BuLL. 681 (Oct. 5, 1947). The six-
teen participating countries were: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,- Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland
Turkey and the United Kingdom. Thereafter, the U.S. Congress appropriated five
billion dollars for European recovery. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, ch. 169, 62
Star. 137 (1948); and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation was estab-
lished to help in the disbursement of the Marshall funds. See U.S. Dept of State, Con-
vention for European Economic Cooperation, signed at Paris on April 16, 1948. (Eco.
nomic Cooperation- Series No. 7 (1948) ).
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tion,42 and by giving political support and encouragement to various
postwar schemes for European integration.48 These schemes were
seen as vehicles for drawing the nation states of Europe closer to-
gether while helping to ensure that another violent conflict in West-
ern Europe would become an impossibility. In fact, it is this prag-
matic commitment of American power to Western Europe which
still in the 1970's forms the "primary foreign policy interest of the
United States. ' 44
Once the American government had seen postwar Europe on its
way to recovery, foreign policy planners anticipated that this eco-
nomic growth could be continued through the flow of private invest-
ment capital into Europe.43 While a variety of reasons can be cited
for the accuracy of the prediction,48 of more importance than the
cause is the impact of the massive American direct investment in
postwar Western Europe.4 7 From 1946 to 1969 the book value of
4 2 See North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1964,
80 U.N.T.S. 171 (effective for U.S. Aug. 24, 1949). The original signatories were:
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States and Greece. Turkey acceded to
the Treaty on Oct. 17, 1951 (126 U.N.T.S. 350) and the Federal Republic of Germany
acceded on Oct. 23, 1954 (243 U.N.T.S. 308). For a general consideration of the U.S.
role in Atlantic Community setup by N.A.T.O. see M. BALL, N.A.T.O. AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION MOVEMENT (1959), and H. CLEVELAND, N.A.T.O.: THE TRANS-
ATLANTIC BARGAIN (1970).
43 See generally F. NORTHROP, EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY (1954); D. HUMPHREY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMON MARKET
(1962); and E. VAN DER BEUGEL, FROM MARSHALL AID To ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP
(1966).
4See speech by Ambassador J. Robert Schaetzel (Head of U.S. Mission to the Euro-
pean Communities), delivered on Feb. 12, 1970, concerning "Relations Between Europe
and the United States After the Summit at the Hague," as reported in Document No.
562 of EUROPE (Agence inter'national d'information pour la presse) (Feb. 19, 1970):
"Still in pursuit of perspective, let me emphasize the strength and continuity of United
States policy toward Europe. The President has reiterated that this is the primary for-
eign policy interest of the United States: within the larger framework he has indicated
support of his Administration for the process of European unity, as has Secretary Rogers.
Because the President feels so keenly that this is a matter primarily for Europeans to de-
cide there have been some who misconstrue discretion for shift of policy. In point of
fact, there has been no shift of national priorities or indeed of national awareness of
the fundamental importance of Europe to our survival."
45 See generally C. RANDALL, A FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE UNITED
STATES (1954); and REPORT OF THE RANDALL COMMISSION, STAFF PAPERS PRE-
SENTED TO THE COMMISSION ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY (1954).
46 For a discussion of some of the reasons surrounding the post-war rise of American
direct investment in Europe see L. KRAUSE, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND
THE UNITED STATES ch. IV (1968).
47 For a thorough analysis of the nature and extent of American direct investment
in Europe see Report on Transatlantic Direct Investment (Rapporteurs: MM Haekkerup
and Rohner), EUR. CONSULT. Ass., 23rd Sess., Doc. 2938 (April 28, 1971) [Herein-
after cited as Transatlantic Investment Report].
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American direct investment in Europe soared from just one billion
dollars to nearly 22 billion dollars; in the six EEC countries alone,
American direct investment totaled over 10 billion dollars as of 1970,
having an estimated replacement value of over 30 billion dollars.
Such investment generated over 60 billion dollars a year in sales,
accounting for more than 1/7th of all new industrial develop-
ments.
48
Whether this surge of American private capital into Europe was
facilitated by the new United States program on bilateral commer-
cial treaties is impossible to demonstrate. Certainly, American di-
rect investment in the United Kingdom prospered in the postwar
years without the benefit of an F.C.N. type treaty; 49 and quite clear-
ly other factors, such as the formation of the Common Market, were
vital in the creation of this dynamic flow of American capital to
Western Europe." However, it would appear that at minimum the
modern F.C.N. treaties with many of the Western European nations
did encourage the generally favorable climate needed to induce
American investment by setting out broad and accepted standards
for the promotion and fostering of this type of capital flow." The
combined American approach in developing a new commercial treaty
program, in encouraging world monetary stability through the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, and in supporting a multilateral ratio-
nalization of world trade through the GATT did provide a sound
basis for European recovery after the war, and for the expansion of
American foreign trade and investment."2
4 8 See THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THEIR COMMON
INTEREST (European Community Info. Serv., Washington, D.C. 1971); and Document
No. 591 of EUROPE (Aug. 26, 1970) on U.S. Investments in Europe: A Memorandum
from the Commission's Press Information Department.
49See Transatlantic Investment Report, supra note 47, at 10: "U.S. direct invest-
ment in Europe was traditionally concentrated in the United Kingdom where it was
facilitated not only by close political and economic links but also by a common lan-
guage and similar legal systems. In 1950 for example, out of a total of 1.7 billion dol-
lars worth of direct investment in Europe, 0.8 billion dollars was concentrated in the
United Kingdom as opposed to 0.6 billion dollars invested in the six ECSC countries.
This pattern remained substantially unaltered until the early 1960's."
50 See A. EDWARDs, INVESTMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 5
(1964): "Clearly, many factors have been responsible for this large, and still rapidly
growing, flow of foreign capital into the Six: demand trends, comparative cost levels,
official investment incentives, and so on, have all played a part. But the most obvious
reason has been the setting up of the EEC as such. The dismantling of trade barriers
within the Community and the process of adjustment towards the common external
tariff have made it advantageous from the point of view of costs to be within the Com-
mon Market instead of exporting to it. Possibly even more important, however,
has been the psychological effect of bringing the EEC into existence."
51 See generally Commercial Treaty Program of the United States, supra note 36.
82 On the interrelation of the importance of the IMF, GATT and bilateral commer-
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III. SALIENT FEATURES OF POSTWAR FRIENDSHIP,
COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION TREATIES
The modern postwar archetypes of American Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation (F.C.N.) treaties are the agreements con-
cluded with the Republic of China in 19461 and with Italy in 1948.
As already mentioned, there occured in these treaties a significant
shift from a historical preoccupation with the facilitation of trade
and navigation to a stress on the various investment or 'establish-
ment" provisions. The postwar series of F.C.N. treaties can be seen
as "commercial" only in the widest possible context of the term.
With respect to modern U.S. bilateral commercial treaties, they
may generally be defined as treaties of establishment. Concerned
with the protection of persons, natural and juridical, and of
property and interests of such persons, "they define the treatment
each country owes the nationals of the other; their right to engage
in business and other activities within the boundaries of the former;
and the respect due them, their property, and their enterprises."54
In the postwar F.C.N. treaties this concept of "establishment" has
proven itself to be rather broad and varying, embracing such sundry
matters as the following: (1) the entry, residence, and sojourn of
persons and their protection after admission; (2) alien's rights to
participate in various types of work and activities; (3) recognition
of the juridical personality of companies; (4) participation of alien
corporations in the corporate and economic life of the host country;
(5) access to courts for individuals and companies; (6) taxation;
(7) exchange restrictions; (8) the rights to acquire and dispose of
property and the protection of alien property; (9) rights as to pat-
ents and trademarks; (10) alien contractors' rights in seeking gov-
ernment contracts and concessions; (11) guarantees of certain basic
personal rights and freedoms; (12) social insurance; and (13) in
cial treaties in forming a rational basis for postwar economic development in the world
see STEINER and VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS Part V (1968).
5 See Treaty of Friendship, Commet'ce and Navigation with the Republic of China,
Nov. 4, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1871, 25 U.N.T.S. 69 (effective Nov. 30, 1948). As noted
in 15 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 866 (1946) concerning the China Treaty: "The trea-
ty is somewhat broader in scope than existing United States commercial treaties with
respect to the rights of corporations, and- includes articles relating to establishment,
landholding, and industrial and literafy property, commercial articles similar in princi-
ple to the general provisions of recent trade agreements, and more detailed coverage
of exchange control, the activities of government monopolies and other matters."
5M H. Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42
MINN. L REV, 805,806 (1958).
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certain cases, even exemption from military service.55 Though the
promotion of international trade still remained a motivating factor
behind the postwar F.C.N. treaties, emphasis increased on those pro-
visions of "establishment" which would afford American investors
"a proper measure of security against undue risks likely to plague
their foreign operations." 8
In the postwar series of commercial treaties such matters as con-
sular rights and functions were no longer dealt with under the
F.C.N. heading." With the negotiation of the French, Belgian, and
Luxembourg treaties, provisions dealing with imports and exports
were specifically omitted. These three treaties thus formed a new
species of the F.C.N. treaty, being essentially treaties of establish-
ment. 8 The reasons for the novel use of these "establishment" trea-
ties with three of the Member States of the European Economic
Community are attributable to several factors. Since January 1,
1948, the trade relations of the United States have centered around
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and any additional
treaty arrangement on the subject would be somewhat redundant."
The crucial factor, however, would seem to be the creation on Janu-
ary 1, 1958 of the European Economic Community. With the F.C.N.
treaties designed for long-term application, such a commitment in
the area of trade would militate against the objective of the EEC
in achieving a common Community policy in the area of external
trade.'* As it was elucidated at the time of the signing of the Con-
vention of Establishment with France:
Along with other governments in Western Europe, the French Gov-
ernment is much preoccupied with developments in connection
with the European Economic Community and is reluctant to enter
long-term engagements on trade matters for fear of resulting dif-
ficulties for the European integration plans. A similar attitude was
5 5 See generally R. WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW ch. 11 (1960).
58 Commercial Treaty Program of the United States, supra note 36; at 4.
V7 See e.g., Consular Convention with France, July 18, 1966, (1967) 18 U.S.T. 2939,
T.I.A.S. No. 6389 (entered into force Jan. 7, 1968).
5s8 In a strict sense, the French Treaty is the only one which does not contain any
trade provisions; though all three of the treaties do tend to illustrate a new development
in U.S. commercial treaty policy toward the EEC countries.
59 For a consideration of those provisions of the F.C.N. treaties which are also cov-
ered by other international agreements (GATT, IM , tax treaties and International
Patent Convention) see H. Walker, Jr., The Post-War Commercial Treaty Program of
the United States, sapra.note 7, at 61-6.
60osee Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as "Treaty of Rome"], esp.
Article 113.
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encountered in the Netherlands negotiations in 1955-56 but was
satisfactorily solved through a special arrangement incorporated in
an exchange of notes. This type of solution was not acceptable to
the French, and it was mutually agreed not to negotiate new trade
provisions in connection with this treaty.6'
Another characteristic of the postwar U.S. commercial treaty
program has been the rising use of the national treatment standard"2
whereby foreign citizens are given the treatment accorded the citi-
zens of a host country. 3  Unlike the most-favored-nation standard
which seeks to achieve a "foreign parity," national treatment is con-
cerned with "inland parity" by conferring upon the alien the same
rights and privileges as a national would receive from its native
government. 4 Illustrative of the wide modern usage of the na-
tional treatment standard are various provisions in the 1953 Ger-
man treaty, wherein national treatment is called for in over a dozen
instances, covering such diverse matters as access to courts, taxation
of treaty nationals and companies, acquisition and disposal of prop-
erty, and the protection of the property of treaty nationals and com-
panies."
As to the treatment to be accorded foreign companies, unlike
the multiple test that had to be met for recognition in the interwar
6143 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 58 (1960).
62 H. Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, supra
note 54 at 811.
63 As commonly defined in modern treaties of commerce, the term "national treat-
ment" means: "a treatment accorded within the territories of a Party upon terms no less
favorable than the treatment accorded therein, in like situations to nationals, companies,
products, vessels or other objects as the case may be of such Party." (emphasis added).
64 See G. Schwarzenberger, The Principles and Standards of International Economic
Law, supra note 4, at 80: "The object of this standard is inland parity. Thus the na-
tionals of the grantor constitute tertium comparationis. The national standard is most
valued in the sphere of establishment, that is the personal and property rights of na-
tionals abroad, their free access to local courts and equality regarding taxation and navi-
gation." Some of the other standards used in commercial treaties are: m/f/n, both
m/f/n and national, international law standard, equitable treatment standard, reciprocity,
and treaty standard.
65 1954 German Treaty, supra, note 1. Article III (protection and security of trea-
ty nationals after entry); Article IV (application of sick benefits and social security);
Article V (the protection of the property of treaty nationals and companies); Article VI
(access to courts for treaty nationals and companies); Article VII (right of treaty na-
tionals and companies, with certain qualifications, to engage in and establish busi-
nesses); Article VIII (right of treaty nationals and companies to engage in scientific,
educational, religious and philanthropic activities); Article IX (the leasing of real prop-
erty, acquisition of personal property, disposition of all types of property, and the suc-
cession to property by treaty nationals and companies); Article X (rights related to in-
dustrial property rights); Article XI (taxation of treaty companies and nationals); Arti-
cle XII (capital movements); Article XIV (all matters relating to the importation and
exportation of goods by treaty nationals and companies); Article XVI (internal treat-
ment of goods); Articles XX, XXI (certain matters relating to navigation).
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series of F.C.N. treaties, the postwar brand set out a simple and un-
qualified criterion based on the incorporation theory.66  As exem-
plified in the 1953 German Treaty, business associations (i.e. a
corporation, partnership, company or other association, whether or
not with limited liability and whether or not for pecuniary profit)
which were validly constituted under the laws of one of the signa-
tories 'Twere to] have their juridical status recognized within the
territories of the other Party" without any further qualifications
from local laws.67
It must be noted however, that the recognition of legal status
does not of itself create any substantive rights. Though such rights
as access to courts could appear to be an automatic consequence of
recognition, this is not necessarily the case. Legal rights, whether
in municipal or international law cannot be assumed as a matter of
individual right, but are only conferred upon the benefactors by
and through the legal structures and instrumentalities created by
"society.""" While it has been suggested that there is "a principle
of customary international law giving to aliens rights to access to
courts on a reasonable basis," ' it seems clear that this would not
hold true with regard to companies. No substantive or procedural
rights for companies can be implied without some positive founda-
tion in the relevant F.C.N. treaty.7"
Since 1923, U.S. commercial treaties have included specific pro-
vision for the right of access to courts for companies. 71 In the post-
66 H. Walker, Jr., Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties,
supra note 9, at 382: "The simple 'classical' test which has been found acceptable by
all countries with which the United States has signed commercial treaties since the last
war, nevertheless, follows a number of earlier treaties, especially examples dating from
the last century, and is consonant also with other precedents. Further, it represents
the practice followed by United States courts in determining the 'citizenship' of cofpora-
tions for jurisdictional and constitutional purposes. Moreover, it fits consistently into
the general scheme of the current treaty type in that it adapts to companies a national-
ity test analogous to that applied with reference to the other major objects dealt with
in the treaties: goods, ships, and individuals."
67 1954 German Treaty, Article XXV (5), supra note 1.
68 For further discussion of the concept of "recognition" see E. RABEL, THE CON-
FLICT OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY Vol. II, ch. 22 (2nd ed., 1958).
69 R. Wilson, Access-To-Courts Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties,
supra note 29, at 47.
7 0 See R. WILSON, U.S. COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 55, at 194-5: "While it is generally presumed, and under liberal rules of construc-
tion presumably would be held, that the recognized possession of the capacity to appear
carries with it the right of appearing, enjoyment of a capacity does not as such neces-
sarily mean that the exercise of the right will be permitted. In any event, the recogni-
tion of the capacity does not determine the terms and conditions under which the right
to sue and be sued may be exercised."
71 See 1923 German Treaty, supra note 13.
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war period, this provision has been based on the national treatment
standard, without reservations by local laws. Moreover, with the
present day proliferation of quasi-judicial agencies and commissions
the provision has been clarified so as to cover "administrative tribu-
nals and agencies." The national treatment standard has also been
employed with regard to requirements concerning security of costs.72
In the matter of the operational rights of treaty companies,
the postwar series of U.S. commercial treaties has generally ex-
tended national treatment to companies engaging in "all types of
commercial, industrial, financial, and other activity for gain. '
This novel extension of the principle of equality of treatment ap-
plies to both the initial establishment of an enterprise and to the
terms and conditions under which the company is entitled subse-
quently to conduct its enterprise.74 Regarding subsequent business
activity, the national treatment standard was made applicable to the
operation of treaty companies in such matters as establishing and
maintaining branches, agencies, offices, factories, and other establish-
ments related to the conduct of their business. It also applies to the
control and management of enterprises which have been established
or acquired, the acquisition majority interests of such companies un-
der domestic law, and the operation of "controlled enterprises" en-
gaging in all activities relating to the conduct of their business. 5
72 See, e.g., 1954 German Treaty, Article VI (1), supra note 1: "Nationals and com-
panies of either Party shall be accorded national treatment with respect to access to the
courts of justice and to administrative tribunals and agencies within the territories of
the othee Party, in all degrees of jurisdiction, both in pursuit and in defense of their
rights. It is understood that companies of either Party not engaged in activities within
the territories of the other Party shall enjoy such access therein without any require-
ment of registration or domestication." With regard to the t'eatment of "security of
costs" see Protocol, para. 6.
73 See H. Walker, Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign In-
vestment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMp. L 229, 236 (1956): 'The
basic principle of national tieeatment with respect to engaging in business activities and
doing the things necessary or incidental thereto, which forms the heart of the treaty as
an investment instrument, has been elaborated to mention the various judicial forms un-
der which an activity can be conducted; to emphasize the owners' prerogatives of control
and management; and to assure that also the enteeprise, qua enterprise, will receive the
stipulated treatment.
74 R. WILSON, U.S. COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note
55, at 197-8.
7 5 See, e.g., 1954 German Treaty, Article VII (1), supra note 1: "Nationals and com-
panies of either Party shall be accorded, within the territories of the other Party, na-
tional treatment with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, finan-
cial and other activity for gain, whether in a department or an independent capacity, and
whether directly or by agentor through the medium of any form of lawful juridicial en-
tity. Accordingly, such nationals and companies shall be permitted within such ter-
fitories: (a) to establish and maintain branches, agencies, offices, factories and other es-
tablishments appropiate to the conduct of their business; (b) to organize companies
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The modern series of F.C.N.'s has not however completely over-
come the social and economic fears of earlier commercial treaties
about extending treaty coverage to corporations. Generally, re-
strictions can be placed on treaty companies with regard to doing
business in areas which are sensitive to national security and well-
being.70  Moreover, in the modern treaties, a specific clause has been
added to ensure that the rights extended by the treaties will not be
extended to third country corporate interests. 7
Also significant for American investors and business has been
the postwar inclusion of companies under the treaty provisions re-
lating to protection of property.78  In inter-war commercial treaties,
no specific provision was made for the protection of property of
treaty companies, however, in the 1946 commercial treaty with China
specific reference was made to the protection of business property,
to the extent that such property should "receive the most constant
protection and security and shall enjoy in this respect the full pro-
tection and security required by international law. ' 79  In addition,
provisions were made against unreasonable searches and molesta-
tion of such company property which precluded the other signatory
state from taking "unreasonable or discriminatory measures that
would impair the legally acquired rights or interest" of such com-
panies within its territory8O
With regard to expropriation of property, a typical provision
adopted in the postwar treaties proscribed the taking of company
property "except for public benefit" and provided that such action
must be in accordance with due process of law and not without just
compensation. 8'
under the general company laws of such other Party, and to acquire majority interests
in companies of such other Party; and (c) to control and manage enterprises which they
have established or acquired. Mor'eover, enterprises which they control, whether in the
form of individual proprietorships, companies or otherwise, shall in all that relates to
the conduct of the activities thereof, be accorded treatment no less favorable than that
accorded like enterprises controlled by nationals of companies of such other Party."
76 Id. Article VII (3) which makes reservations with regard to communications, air
or water transport, making and administering trusts, banking involving depository func-
tions, of the exploitation of land or other natural resources. In all events, though,
m/f/n treatment must be shown. Further by Article VII (3) special formalities re-
garding the establishment of alien-controlled enterprises may be employed, though they
may not substantially impair the rights granted by Article VII (1).
77 Id. Article XXIV (1) (e). This type of clause has been inserted in modern
F.C.N.'s in order to prevent "free rides" and to permit "piercing of the corporate viel."
78 See generally R. Wilson, Property-Protection Provisions in United States Cor-
mercial Treaties, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (1951).
70 China Treaty, Article, Article VI (1), suapra note 5 3.
80 See, e.g.., 1954 German Treaty, Article V (2) & (3), suPra note 1.
81 Id. Article V (4). With regard to expropriation of property a typical formula
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In general, postwar commercial treaties have also required both
most-favored nation and national treatment in all matters pertaining
to the expropriation of privately owned enterprises.82
Various other provisions reflecting the shift of emphasis to mat-
ters of investment have been introduced into the postwar commer-
cial treaties. For example, concerned over minimizing competitive
discrepancies between private and state-controlled business enter-
prises, the United States has successfully inserted clauses into post-
war treaties which help to ensure equitable and non-discriminatory
treatment of treaty nationals and companies in their commercial deal-
ings with the state enterprises, especially in the securing of govern-
ment contracts and concessions.8
Also, since the Second World War, U.S. commercial treaties re-
flect great concern about commercial arbitration, and it has become
standard treaty practice to seek the inclusion of a commercial arbi-
tration clause in the modern F.C.N.-type treaties.84  The approach
taken by the United States in seeking arbitration provisions has not
been whether local law will favor or encourage arbitration, but rather
that such development as does occur will not be narrowly national-
istic.85
in the postwar treaties reads: "Property of nationals and companies of either Party shall
not be taken within the territories of the other Party, except for public benefit and in
accordance with due process of law, noe shall it be taken without just compensation."
This formula makes the following stipulation concerning payments and exchange
withdrawals connected with a lawful expropriation: "Such compensation shall represent
the equivalent of the property taken and shall be made in an effectively realizable form
and without unnecessary delay."
82 On the international legal implications of expropriation see generally W. BISHOP,
JR., INTERNATIONAL LAw 851-99 (3rd ed. 1971).
88 See, e.g., 1954 German Treaty, Article XVII, supra note 1.
84 Id. Article VI (2): "Contracts entered into between nationals or companies of
either Party and nationals or companies of the other Party, that ptsovide for the settle-
ment by arbitration of controversies, shall not be deemed unenforceable within the ter-
ritories of such other Party merely on grounds that the place designated foe the arbitra-
tion proceedings is outside such territories or that the nationality of one or more of the
arbitrators is not that of such other Paty. Awards duly rendered pursuant to any such
contracts, which are final and enforceable under the laws of the place where rendered,
shall be deemed conclusive in enforcement proceedings brought before the courts of
competent jurisdiction of eithet Party, and shall be entitled to be declared enforceable
by such courts, except where found contrary to public policy. When so declared, such
awards shall be entitled to privileges and measures of enforcement appertaining to
awards rendered locally. It is understood, however, that awards tendered outside the
United States of America shall be entitled in any court in any State thereof only to the
same measure of recognition as awards rendered in other States thereof,"
85H. Walker, Jr., Comrmercial Arbitration in United States Treaties, 11 Arb. J.
(N.S.) 68 (1956). "These treaties are not concerned with whether, or to what extent, or
under what procedures, or subject to what measure of judicial supervision, the law will
favor and encourage arbitration. .. . Their concern, rather, is merely to assure that
such evolution as does occur will not be narrowly nationalistic, but will allow arbi-
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Further, in the Department of State's postwar endeavors to en-
courage American foreign investment, a specific clause was added
to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to clarify the status
of "treaty merchants,"86 and to introduce the new status of "treaty-
investor" to those exempted from the immigration quotas of U.S.
law.8 Though the "treaty-investor" clause in post-1952 commer-
cial treaties is generally "subject to the right of either Party to apply
measures that are necessary to maintain public order and protect
the public health, morals and safety," ' the clause has served as a
primary instrument to effectuate postwar U.S. commercial policy by
extending mutuality concerning investors to treaty parties without
contravening existing U.S. immigration laws. The desirable result
of such provisions from the point of view of commercial exchange
and the efficient direction of capital is evident when it is recognized
that American merchants cannot, "reasonably expect to secure entry
and opportunities in foreign countries unless persons from those
countries have comparable entry and opportunities in the United
States."8
In addition, the modern F.C.N. treaties have helped foster an
tration involving international relationships to grow and flourish, if it will, in measure
with arbitration generally. . . . The appfoach taken in these treaties to arbitration,
though modest, is thus realistic." Id., at 82-3.
86 When the Immigration Act of 1924 and its strict quantitative restrictions on
aliens was being discussed in Congress, the State Department became deeply concerned
that the passage of this Act would impair various rights already granted under existing
commercial treaties to "treaty merchants." To avoid this conflict, Congress finally in-
serted into the 1924 Act a clause that would exempt from alien status "an alien en-
titled to enter the United States solely to cary on trade under and in pursuance of the
provisions of a present existing treaty of commerce and navigation." A 1932 amend-
ment to the Act explicitly extended the "treaty-merchant" benefits to treaties concluded
subsequent to 1924. For further discussion see R. Wilson, Treaty-Merchant Clauses in
Commercial Treaties of the United States, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1950).
87 In the Department of State's postwar endeavors to encourage American foreign
investment, a similar result was worked out with regard to "treaty-investors. Congress
inserted the following clause in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952:
The term 'immigrant' means every alien except ....
(E) an alien entitled to enter the United States under and in putsuance of
the provisions of a treaty of commerce and navigation between the United
States and the foreign state of which he is a national, and the spouse and
children of such alien if accompanying or following to join him: (i) solely to
carry on substantial trade, principally between the United States and the for-
eign state of which he is a national; or (ii) solely to develop and direct the
operations of an enterprise in which he has invested, or an enterprise in which
he is actively in the process of investing, a substantial amount of capital. [8
U.S.C.A. 1101 (15)(E)].
88 See, e.g., 1954 German Treaty, Article 11 (5), supra note 1.
89 R. WILSON, U.S. COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
55, at 44. For further consideration see R. Wilson, 'Treaty-Investor" Clauses in Com-
mercial Treaties of the United States, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 366 (1955).
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international climate conducive to the flow of American venture cap-
ital through various other provisions dealing with exchange restric-
tions and capital movement controls, the internal taxation of corpo-
rate income, and the industrial property rights of companies.90 In
effect, the postwar treaties have endeavored to extend as full protec-
tion as possible to individual and corporate American investors
abroad.
In summary it may be said that throughout its history in
American practice, the bilateral commercial treaty has proved itself
to be a convenient and viable medium for the implementation of
certain aspects of American economic and political foreign policy.
In the postwar era, these treaties have been reworked to help foster
a favorable setting for the advancement and protection of American
foreign investments. As commented by Professor Metzger:
The most basic and recurring commitments made by the United
States in the field of international trade and investments are con-
tained in 'Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties.' . . . In
the case of a number of countries, they are the only firm interna-
tional commitments we have, and in the case of most countries, they
are the only commitment of such wide scope.91
However, despite the functional value of these treaties from a
governmental level, the question remains as to what is the actual
value of these modern "investment" and "establishment" treaties for
the businessman. As already mentioned, U.S. business relations
with a country like the United Kingdom have prospered without the
existence of any modern F.C.N. treaty. In addition, the American
Bar Association's Committee on International Trade and Investment,
reporting on the significance of the Convention of Establishment
with France to the American businessman and investor in France,
stated:
(T)he survey suggests that companies are reluctant to resort to the
provisions of the Convention or to the State Department or other
U.S. Government agency. This attitude is illustrated by the com-
ment of one company that it has 'never considered it politically
expedient to utilize the provisions of the (Convention)'. . . . The
seeming reluctance of American companies to resort to the Conven-
tion and to request assistance from the State Department suggests
90 See generally H. Walker, Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of
Foreign Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. CoMP. L. 229 (1956).
9' S. Metzger, Commercial Treaties of the United States and Private Foreign In-
vestment, 19 FED. B. ASS'N J. 367, (1959).
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the conclusion that the Convention as a practical matter, is of little
benefit to the company operating in France .... 92
To this author the practical value of the modern Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation treaty, though it may not be resorted
to by the business community, is found in the fact that it is an in-
strument which creates internationally binding obligations on the
signatories, many of which can be enforced in the municipal courts.9"
As American investors and businessmen cannot generally assume
any rights or guarantees save for certain limited standards of treat-
ment which may be required by customary international law,94 the
modern F.C.N. in effect serves as a skeletal form of constitution for
these investors and businessmen. The F.C.N. sets out broad stan-
dards of treatment to foster non-discrimination toward American
investors and enterprises abroad, their employees and their prop-
erty. Though this aspect of the matter is often overlooked, it cer-
tainly cannot be taken for granted.95 The modern U.S. bilateral
commercial treaty, therefore, finds practical significance by the fact
that it is a long-term vehicle for setting out broad guarantees for
American nationals and companies, which create international obli-
gations among the signatories and which often creates rights and
obligations within the municipal legal systems of the signatories.
IV. STATUS OF F.C.N.'s wiTH EEC MEMBER STATES
While the functional value of U.S. bilateral commercial treaties
with Western European nations can be elucidated, a fundamental
question remains as to what is the actual legal status of those
F.C.N.'s now in existence with the original and acceding members
92 American Bar Association, 1965 PROCEEDINGS, Section of Int'l and Comp. Law,
215, 221 [hereinafter cited as ABA Treaty Report].
93 See, e.g., Judgment of Dec. 19, 1957, 26 BGHZ 200 (German Federal Supreme
Court, 1957). Note, however, much depends upon the varying constitutional status
such treaties will have in the municipal laws of the states concerned. For a further
consideration on this point see, STEIN AND HAY, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE AT-
LANTIC AREA ch. 1 (1968).
9 4 See J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 276-91 (6th ed. 1963), who notes
in part at 276: "No state is legally bound to admit aliens into its territory, but if it does
so it must observe a certain standard of decent treatment towards them, and their own
state may demand reparation for an injury caused to them by a failure to observe this
standard."
95 See, e.g., ABA Treaty Report, supra note 92, at 221: "Since the majority of com-
panies that responded to the questionnair'e report that they had not experienced diffi-
culties in their French operations, it can be concluded that the present French policy
is to treat American companies now operating in France fairly and equitably. That
this is in part due to the Convention of Establishment may be assumed - although
this is not subject of proof."
1972]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
to the European Economic Community. In effect, what change in
status, if any, has the creation of the EEC had and what effect will
it have on the existing F.C.N.'s in question?
Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome not only provides that
"(a)fter the expiry of the transitional period the common commer-
cial policy shall be based on uniformly established principles .... "
but also visualizes the Community as an international legal entity
which will supplant the Member States in the negotiating of those
agreements concerning their external commercial relations. The area
of commercial policy is "one of those fields in which under the
Treaty of Rome, the surrender by the member states of their nation-
al sovereignty both outside and within the Community seems abso-
lutely clear."96
While the Treaty of Rome provided for a twelve-year transition-
al period (consisting of three stages, each of which could extend up
to four years) which would progressively lead to the establishment
of the full Common Market as of January 1, 1970, the specific
measures to be taken in the sphere of commercial policy were not
stipulated in the seven articles of the Treaty dealing with the com-
mon commercial policy of the Community. Article III of the Trea-
ty of Rome, however, placed the general and explicit obligation
upon the Member States to "coordinate their commercial relations
with third countries so as to bring about by the end of the transi-
tional period, the conditions necessary for putting into effect a com-
mon policy in the field of external trade."
Moreover, while the Treaty of Rome left the Member States with
the ultimate power to conclude or renew commercial agreements
with non-member countries during the transitional period, there was
in principle no real question that this power would be transferred
to the Community at the end of that period.' As early as October
96 C. Kim, Developments in the Commercial Policy of the European Economic Com-
munity, 8 COMMON MARKET LAW REviEW 148, 149 (1971). For a genefal consider-
ation of the international personality of the European Community see, W. Feld, The
Competence of the European Communities for the Conduct of External Relations, 43
TEXAS L. REv. 891 (1965); J. Louis, Droit et politique des relations ext~rieures des
Communautis europiennes, [19711 CAH. DR. EUR. 3; P. Pescatore, Les relations ex-
tdrieures des Communaut s europ~ennes, 103 RECUEIL DES COURS, ACADEMIh DE
DROr INTERNATIONAL 1 (1961); and J. RAux, LES REATIONS EXTPRIEURES DE LA
COMMUNAUTh ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE (1966).
97 Articles 110-116 of the Treaty of Rome specifically deal with commercial policy.
9 8 See, e.g., J. MWgret, Le pouvoir de la Communautd 9conomique europ6enne de
conclure des accords internationaux, [19641 RhvuE MARCHP COMMUN 529, 532. See
also, Rapport fait au nom de la commission du commerce ext6rieur sur l'instauration
progressive de la politique commerciale commun, Rapporteaur: M. Kahn [1965-66]
EUR. PARL, DOCS., No. 3 (March 22, 1965).
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1961, the EEC Council of Ministers had instituted a system of noti-
fication and consultation between the Member States and the EEC
Commission with regard to the conclusion or renewal of commer-
cial agrements with third countries." Further to this end, the Coun-
cil of Ministers stipulated that "(c)ommercial agreements between
Member States and third states shall not be concluded for periods
exceeding the transitional period of the treaty," and even during
the transitional period, "agreements which do not contain the EEC
clause nor provide for termination upon one year's notice, shall not
be concluded for periods exceeding one year."' 00
Though the principle may have been relatively uncontroversial,
in practice the Member States have been hesitant to accept the Com-
munity's dominant role in the sphere of commercial policy in the
post-transitional period. Quite simply, the Member States have con-
tinued in varying degrees to be jealous of their independence in
matters of external trade policy, which has traditionally been one
of the prime vehicles for the exercise of sovereign national for-
eign policy. 101 Because of this, even with the end of the transitional
period, the European Community is still a long way from having
crystallized any concrete and coherent approach to the final imple-
mentation of a common commercial policy.
Because it is far from clear what the Community's common com-
mercial policy will finally entail, it is extremely difficult to gauge the
effect which the implementation of this policy will have on the sta-
tus of the bilateral commercial treaties now in force between each
of the original and acceding members of the Community and the
United States. This state of imprecision has been further aggra-
vated by Decision 69/494/EEC of the Council of Ministers, con-
cerning the progressive standardization of negotiation procedures re-
99 Council of Minsters (E.E.C.), D.CISION CONCERNANT UNE PROCUDURE DE CON-
SULTATIONS SUR LES NtGOCIATIONS DES ACCORDS RELATIPS AUX RELATIONS COM-
MERCIALES DES ]RTATS MEMBERS AVOC LES PAYS TIERS ET SUR LES MODIFICATIONS DU
RtGIME DE LIBtRATION A L'EGARD DES PAYS TIERS, DU 9 0CTOBRE 1961, [1961]
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DES COMMUNAUTbS EUROP]IENNES 1273 [hereinafter cited as
E.C.o.].
100 Council of Ministers (E.E.C.), DkIsION RELATIVE A L'UNIFORMISATION DE LA
DUR]RE DES ACCORDS COMMERCIAUX AVEC LES PAYS TIERS, DU 9 OCTOBRE 1961,
[1961] E.C.J.O. 1274. For the official text of the "EEC clause," see [1960) E.C.J.O.
1965. The text reads: "Should the obligations which result from the European Econom-
ic Community and which provide for the progressive establishment of a common com-
mercial policy necessitate it, negotiations shall be opened without delay in order to pro-
vide for all appropriate modification of the agreement."
101 For a consideration of certain ways in which a nation's external trade policy can
be used to further its foreign policy, see PALMER AND PERKINS, INTERNATIONAL RE-
LATIONS ch. 6 (1957).
19721
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
lated to commercial agreements between Community members and
third countries.102
In a paradoxical way Decision 69/494/EEC has been both a
supplement to and a derogation from the above-mentioned Council
decisions of 1961. By Article 2 of Decision 69/494/EEC, pro-
vision has been made for consultation between the relevant Mem-
ber States and the European Commission in examining whether or
not, and to what extent, the existing bilateral agreements in question
come under the common commercial policy of Article 113 of the
Treaty of Rome. Thereafter, the Commission may propose to the
Council of Ministers that the agreement, or any part thereof, should
be continued in force for a period of not more than one year if it
has been determined that such prolongation does not constitute a
present obstacle to the working out of the common commercial pol-
icy. If the agreement under consideration contains an EEC clause
or an annual denunciation clause, then continuance may be for a
longer period. °8
Decision 69/494/EEC has in effect struck a curious compromise
and balance, where in large part the Member States have main-
tained for the moment the practical and effective control over their
external commercial relations, while the Community has continued
to assert the ultimate legal control in the sphere of commercial
policy embraced by Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome. In evalu-
ating this situation, one commentator has remarked:
"Faced with political, economic and technical difficulties the Com-
munity organs did not want to proceed (and, to a certain extent,
could not have proceeded) to replace the Member States in commer-
cial agreements. They have preferred to go for a practical and
flexible solution while trying to avoid jeopardizing the establish-
ment of a common commercial policy."'10 4
In pursuance of Decision 69/494/EEC, the Council of Ministers,
on the proposal of the Commission, came to consider the status of
various bilateral treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
and other similar accords between the Member States of the Com-
102 Council of Ministers (E.C.) DtCSION 69/494/CEE CONCERNANT L'UNIFORMI-
SATION PROGRESSIVE DES ACCORDS RELATIFS AUX RELATIONS COMMERCIALES DES
.TATS MEMBRES AVEC LES PAYS TIERS ET LA NtGOCIATION DES ACCORDS COMMUNAU-
TAIRES, DU 16 DCEMBRE 1969, [1969] E.C.J.O. 326, 39.
108 Id., Article 3. For a further' analysis of Decision 69/494/EEC see Leonard and
Simon, La mise en oeuvre de la politique comrmerciale commune: passage de la p~riode
de transition a la piriod df/initive, 1971 RAVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EURO-
PPE 107, at 139-44.
104 C. Kim, Developments in the Commercial Policy of the European Economic Com-
munity, supra note 96, 164.
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munity and third countries. Accordingly by Decision 70/470/EEC
the Council issued a list of agreements which could be maintained
in force until December 31, 1972, including treaties of the F.C.N.
classification between the United States, and Italy, Germany, the
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. 0 5
There was no clarification as to which parts of these various
F.C.N. treaties are to be considered relevant in light of Article
113,106 that is, which parts of the treaties may have to be renegoti-
ated with the Community after December 31, 1972. However, with
the exclusion of the Convention on Establishment with France from
this list of treaties relevant, to Article 113, it appears clear that the
Council of Ministers rejects the view espoused by certain com-
mentators that the content of Article 113 is to embrace all matters
directly or indirectly affecting the movement of goods and services
into and out of the Community. From the Council's stance such
matters as establishment, capital movements, and transportation are
to be excluded from the notion of a common commercial policy as
these matters are dealt with in sections of the Treaty of Rome which
are separate and distinct from the section on commercial policy.0 7
At minimum, however, the exclusive treaty-making competence of
the Community in matters of commercial policy covers "tariff and
105Council of Ministers (E.C.), DfiCISION 70/470/CEE AUTORISANT LA TAC-
ITh RECONDUCTION OU LE MAINTEIN EN VIGEUR DE CERTAINS TRAITES D'AMITI9 DE
COMMERCE ET DE NAVIGATION ET ACCORDS SIMILAIRES CONCLUS PAR LES ATATS
MEMBRES AVEC DES PAYS TIERS, DU 13 OCTOBRE 1970 t19701 E.C.J.O. L. 231, at 7.
106 Concerning Article 113 and the implementation of the common commercial pol-
icy see generally: U. Evefling, Legal Problems of the Common Commercial Policy of
the European Economic Community, 4 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 141 (1966-
67); C. Kim, The Common Commercial Policy of the EEC, Quantitative Restriction
and Import Control, 4 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 29 (1970); C. Kim, Developments in
the Commercial Policy of the European Economic Community, supra note 96; G. Le
Tallec, The Common Commercial Policy of the EEC, 20 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 732
(1971); Leonard and Simon, La mise en oeuvre de la politique commerciale commune,
supra note 103; P. PESCATORE, La Politique Commerciale, in LES NOUVELLES: DROIT
DES COMMUNAUTPS EUROPhENNES (1968); J. Schneider, La mise en oeuvre de la po-
litique commerciale commune de la C.E.E.: Bilan et perspectives," [19701 REVUE
MARCH] COMMUN 11; E. Wohlfarth, The European Economic Community and World
Trade, in THE EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND TECHNIQUE
1 (British Inst. of Int'l & Comp. L., Special Pub. No. 7, (1965); and Rapport fait au norm
de la commission des relations &conomiques ext4rieures sur les problemes de la politique
commerciale commun a l'issue de la p~riode de transition pr~vue par le traitW CEE,
Rapporteur: M. Kreidemann, [1970-1971) Eur. Parl. Docs. No. 32.
107 See Report on the third colloquim about the merger of the European Communi-
ties, held at the Institute of European Legal Studies, University of Litge, Oct. 25-27,
1967, 5 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 346 (1967-68). The first topic of considera-
tion of the Colloquim concerned the international personality of the Community; the
second topiF dealt with the common commercial policy of the Community. Of note,
the Institute prepared and has published a CAHIER DE DOCUMENTATION of four volumes
concerned with the topics discussed.
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trade agreements . . . the establishment of uniform practices as re-
gards measures of liberalization ... export policy . . . and commer-
cial protective measures including measures to be taken in case of
dumping or subsidies.' '10 8
While it is evident, even from the viewpoint of the Council of
Ministers, that those matters directly affecting the external trade of
the Community fall within the exclusive control of the Community,
a new dimension to this matter has been added by the recent Court
of Justice decision in Commission v. Council."9 Though the facts
surrounding this case center around the negotiation of a European
Road Transport Agreement (ERTA), the prime importance of this
case is capsulized in the Court's views on the general treaty-making
competence of the Community."' Here the Court of Justice was
108 Treaty of Rome, Article 113 (1). This listing, however, is not exhaustive.
109 Court of Justice of the European Communities, Commision des Communaut6s
europ~ennes contre Conseil des Communaut6s europ6ennes (Ar'et 22/70), March 31,
1971, (hereinafter cited as Commission v. Council]. Any english translation used in
connection with this case is in conformity with the translation supplied through the ser-
vices of the European Communities.
Perhaps it may be useful here to briefly summarize the institutional setup of the
Eur'opean Communities (EEC, ECSC and Euratom), which since July 1, 1967 have
had the following common institutions:
1) The Council of Ministers: This body consists of any council of Cabinet ministers
from the Member States, coming together in Brussels primarily to discuss Commission
proposals. For the consideration of the more important matters of Community con-
cern, the respective foreign ministers Will meet approximately once a month. In prin-
ciple, the Treaty of Rome conceived of the Council as principle decision-making organ
in the Community.
2) The European Commission: In the newly expanded Community, the Commission
will consist of 13 members, selected for their general competence and independence.
Each member holds office for five years, the President and Vice-President being appointed
for two years. Assisted by a staff of over 5,000 "Eurocrats" in Brussels, the Commission
is the prime initiator and formulator of Community actions and policies.
3) The European Assembly: In the expanded Community, there will be some 198
members of the Assembly, with the breakdown by nationality being Italy, France, Ger-
many and the United Kingdom 36 members each, Belgium and the Netherlands 14
each, Denmark and Ireland 10, Luxembourg 6. Though the Treaty of Rome envisages
the direct election of Assembly members, these members presently are selected by the
various parliaments of the six Member States. The Assembly, which meets monthly,
has to date only minimal effective political power in the Community's decision-making
process: the main tasks of the Assembly are the rendering of standing committee s'eports
and the questioning of members of the Commission visiting Strasbourg.
4) The European Court of Justice: In the expanded Community, the Court will
consist of 11 judges, with an alternate turnover or renewal of appointments for five
judges and two advocat-gene'als, and six judges and one advocat-general, every three
years. These judges, sitting in Luxembourg, endeavor to ensure that "the law is ob-
served in the interpretation and implementation" of the EEC, ECSC, and Euratom trea-
ties.
110 Commission v. Council, supra note 109. Quite briefly the facts of this case are
as follows: In pursuance to Article 75 of the Treaty of Rome concerning the implemen-
tation of a Community transport policy, the Council of Ministers (acting on a proposal
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to embrace a theory of "parallelism" which states that the Com-
munity would possess the same degree of competence to deal with
external affairs as it possesses internally."'
In ascertaining whether or not the Community had the compe-
tence to negotiate and conclude the ERTA, the Court of Justice
could find no specific provisions of the Treaty of Rome concerning
the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the
sphere of transport policy. The Court in considering the general
system of Community law relating to agreements with non-Member
States, did however express the view that the Community shall have
a "legal personality,""'  and noted that in its external relations, the
Community enjoys the capacity to establish contractual links with
non-Member States over the whole extent of the field of objectives
defined in Part One of the Treaty.'"' (emphasis added)
In further considering this general treaty-making power of the
Community under the Treaty of Rome, the Court went on to state:
"To determine in a particular case the Community's authority to
enter into international agreements, one must have regard to the
whole scheme of the Treaty no less than to its specific provisions.
Such authority may arise not only from an explicit grant by the
Treaty - as is the case with Article 113 and 114 for tariff and
trade agreements and with Article 238 for association agreements
- but may actually flow from other provisions of the Treaty and
from steps taken, within the framework of these provisions, by the
Community institutions. In particular, each time the Community,
from the Commission) adopted a regulation related to various aspects of the driving
times for road transportation. The effective date of the regulation which concerned
traffic between the Community and n on-Member States was postponed until Oct. 1, 1970
(the other parts taking effect a year earlier). This postponement was necessitated by the
desire of the Community to reconcile the provisions of the regulation with parallel
work being carried on by the Transport Committee of the Economic Commission for
Europe on a European Agreement on International Road Transport Workers (ERTA).
A previous ERTA had been concluded in 1962, but failed to collect the required num-
ber of signatures. The present ERTA was a further attempt to gain signature.
The Council of Ministers issued a communiqu6 at the conclusion of a session in
March 1970 approving "a mandate to allow the Member States to continue negotiations
for the conclusion" of the ERTA. The updated ERTA was completed in April, 1970
and opened for signature on July 1, 1970. In a compromise, the Council had agreed
to adjust its earlier regulation so as to bring it into accord with the revised ERTA.
Against all this the European Commission insisted that it should have been the sole
representative of the Community members at the negotiation of the ERTA; and on
May 19, 1970, the Commission filed an application with the European Court of Justice
seeking an annulment of the Council's "discussion" on March 20th.
111 For a consideration of this theory of "parallelism" see R. Dupuy. "Du caractre
unitaire de la Communautg gconomique euopgenne dans ses relations exterieures," 9
ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 779, 804 (196 ); and L. ANANIADES,
L'ASSOCIATION AUX COMMUNAUTLS EUROPfENNES 121 (1967).
112 Commission v. Council, supra note 109, 20.
11 Id,
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with a view to implementing a common policy envisaged by the
Treaty, lays down common rules, whatever form these may take,
the Member States no longer have the right, acting individually or
even collectively, to contract obligations toward non-Member States
affecting these rules .... (I)t follows that to the extent that Com-
munity rules are promulgated for the attainment of the purposes
of the Treaty, the Member States cannot, outside the framework of
Community institutions, assume obligations likely to affect such
rules or alter their scope." (emphasis added).114
As to the question of concurrent authority on the part of the Mem-
ber States to conclude such agreements, the Court rejected this pos-
sibility, as any such initiative without the common framework of
Community institutions would be inconsistent with the unity of the
Common Market and with the uniform application of Community
law. 5
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The problems posed for the possible renegotiation of U.S. bilat-
eral commercial treaties with the Member States of the European
Community are myriad and complex. The most basic of these prob-
lems is whether or not it is of value for the United States to continue
the use of the F.C.N. with the countries in question. However, as
already explicated, the F.C.N. has a very real and functional worth
for the American government, American investors, and American
companies in Western Europe. With a growing unrest in the EEC
as how best to deal with the American enterprise in the Commun-
ity," 6 it would appear essential that the United States continue to
seek long-term treaty commitments protecting the rights of Ameri-
can business and nationals in Western Europe.
The second problem to arise is of a far more technical nature,
that is, which provisions of the existing F.C.N.'s will have to be
renegotiated. Clearly, all those provisions falling under Article
114 Id., 20-2 1.
115 Id. 23: "(G)ette competence communautaire exclud la possibilit6 d'une compk-
tence concurfente des ttats membres, toute initiative prise hors du cadre des institu-
tions communes 6tant incompatible avec l'unit6 du march6 commun et l'application uni-
form droit communautaire."
116 See e.g., statement by the European Commission on American direct investment
in Europe, as reported in Document No. 591 of EUROPE Aug. 26, 1970: "A list can be
drawn up of the pros and cons of American investments. There is no denying that they
spread economic prosperity and technological progress. They act as a stimulus to numer-
ous European firms. But this progress is not, in the first instance, of benefit to Euro-
peans. As a number of cases have shown as regards employment, research, defence or
international trade relations (notably with State-teading countries) the policies of com-
panies so formed remain, in the final analysis, the offshoot of industrial, and even politi-
cal, headquarters situated outside this continent."
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113 of the Treaty of Rome will have to be dealt with. This auto-
matically raises the task of determining the actual content and scope
of the Community's common commercial policy. Further, though
the Court of Justice's statements expressed in Commission v. Coun-
cil concerning the exclusive treaty-making competence of the Com-
munity have been characterized by certain writers as an abuse of
judicial powers," 7 they do, nevertheless, represent the mind of the
Court on this matter." 8  With the Court of Justice being the ulti-
mate interpretor of the Treaty of Rome and with its decisions being
binding on the Member States of the Community, the Court's ap-
parent acceptance of the theory of "parallelism" must be treated
most seriously." 9  From a purely legal stance, it would according-
ly appear that for all those matters (including establishment and
capital movements) in which the Community has the internal com-
petence it also possesses an exclusive external competence.
As to those provisions of the F.C.N. treaties which are likely to
be reconsidered, this writer suggests that the United States should
concentrate on negotiating only a treaty of establishment similar to
that concluded with France. As all members of the ten original
and acceding members of the European Community are represented
in GATT and the IMF, those provisions of the F.C.N.'s dealing
with matters concerning the movement and treatment of goods, and
of exchange controls are redundant. The argument that these pro-
visions in the F.C.N. were a "fall-back" in the event of the failure
of the GATT or IMF now seems irrelevant. 20  As to matters con-
cerning navigation, these could be worked out (as desired) in sepa-
117 See L'arrit du 31 mars 1971, 1971 RhvuE MARCHt COMMUN No. 144, 211,
213. For other commentaries on Commission v. Council see D. Collinson, The Foreign
Relations Powers of the European Communities: A Comment on "Commission v. Coun-
cil," 23 STAN. L. REV. 956 (1971); J. Louis, "Cour de justice, 31 mars 1971,"
[1971] CAHIER DU DROIT EUROPEEN 468; and comment by J. Winter in 8 COMMON
MARKET LAW REVIEW 392 (1971).
118 As the Court of Justice is not bound by the common law doctrine of precedent,
the Court's statement's on the treaty-making competence of the Community cannot even
be technically equated with "dicta." However, in practical terms the Court's statement
must not be neglected, for they are a very real indication of what the Court's mind is
on the subject.
119 Treaty of Rome, Article 171.
120 See H. Walker, Jr., The Post-War Commercial Treaty Program of the United
States, supra note 8, at 63: "First, especially as the GATT still operates on a provisional
basis, the treaty (F.C.N.) provides a basic agreement to fall back on if, foe any reason,
the GATT should cease to be in effect between the treaty signatories." However with
the GATT being in existence for over two decades now and with the growing inter-
dependence of world trade, such bilateral safeguards do not seem wholly necessary any-
more.
1972J
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
rate bilateral treaties, as was done with the case of consular provi-
sions.
The final problem, and perhaps the most important from a long-
term point of view, is whether the United States should continue
to pursue the bilateral approach to commercial treaties with the
Member States of the European Community (merely seeking Com-
munity approval of those provisions required), or whether the
United States should make the proposal for the negotiation of a
Community accord on establishment. Though there may well be an
initial fear on the part of the United States that it may end up with
a worse package dealing with the Community than it would bilater-
ally, the United States should be realistic in negotiating the matters
in question with the party who has the ultimate control over such
matters. Considering the Community's participation in the Kennedy
Round,' 2 ' the Werner and Davignon Reports, 22 the recent Com-
munity's stance in the international monetary crisis precipitated by
Nixon's New Economic Policy,128 and the upcoming round of trade
talks between the Community and the United States, 124 it is becom-
ing more and more evident that it is the Community, and not the
individual Member States, that is to be reckoned with in economic
and monetary matters. 125
121 See G. Testa, Le Kennedy Round quelques aspects juridiques, 1968 ANNUAIRE
FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 605.
12 See Report of the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of
Political Unification (Davignon Report) of Oct. 27, 1970, 11 BULLETIN OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES 9 (1970); and Report to the Council and Commission on the
Realization by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union in the Community (Werner
Report) of Oct. 8, 1970, 11 BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Suppl.
(1970).
123 See Common Market Reacts to New U.S. Monetary Policies, Press Release (Euro-
pean Communities, Aug. 20, 1971).
124 See United States-Common Market Trade Talks Open in Bfussels, Press Release
(European Communities, Dec. 20, 1971).
125 In further evidence of the growing competence of the EEC in economic and mone-
tary matters.
[Vol, 5: 4
SYMPOSIUM:
U. S. - Canadian Energy Resource
Development
